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Intestacy and the Surviving Spouse
Virginia's original statute of descent, enacted in 1785, was
drafted by Thomas Jefferson with the advice and criticism of
Edmund Pendleton and George Wythe. It abolished the law of
primogeniture and made realty descendible in parcenary to the
next of kin, as personal property was by the statute of distribution. Along with the abolition of primogeniture another improvement over the common law was made by Jefferson when he gave
the surviving spouse an interest under intestate succession apart
from dower and curtesy. 1 To be sure, the surviving spouse did
not take until the tenth step, but that was a great improvement
over the common law which gave the surviving spouse no fee
interest whatsoever.
It was not until 19222 that the surviving spouse moved up
to the fourth step in the course of descents. This advancement of
the surviving spouse may have been prompted by the changing
concept of the family as a unit. In earlier times, the term family
frequently provoked thought of uncles, aunts, cousins, grandparents, and numerous other relatives and in-laws all living together in the ancestral home and depending upon the joint efforts
of all for livelihood and protection. By the twentieth century the
concept of the family as a unit had changed to include just
the parents and children with perhaps a few families including
dependent collaterals or ancestors. With this diminution of a
previously broad concept it was no doubt felt by the Virginia
legislature that the surviving spouse, the very core of the family
group, should take in preference to more remote relatives who
were often so far detached from the decedent as to be termed
'laughing heirs." Since that time no material3 change has been
made in the course of descents generally, and the same steps of
descent are in effect today4 as were law in 1923. The General
Assembly of 1922 made a step in the right direction but its mistake was in not going far enough.

1 Va. Code §2548 (1887).

'Va. Acts 1922, p. 861.
In 1923 uncles and aunts were put in step seven, as they had evidently been entirely
left out of the 1922 act through an oversight.
'Va. Code §64.1 (1950).

Under Virginia law the surviving spouse of an intestate has
always been included in the first class of distributees. Under the
Code of 1887 if a wife died intestate leaving a surviving husband,
he would take all of the personalty; if no husband survived,
the personalty would pass in the same order as realty. Under the
same law, if a man died intestate leaving a wife surviving, she
would take one-third of the personal estate when issue also survived; if no issue survived, she would take all of the personalty
that the husband acquired from her by reason of the marriage
under the old married woman's law and one-half of any other personal property of which he died possessed 5 By 1919 the distinction between the intestacy of a man and that of a woman had been
withdrawn, and a surviving spouse was given one-third of the
personalty if issue survived; otherwise, all of the personal estate
passed to the intestate's surviving spouse. 6 Since that time no
material change has been made in the distribution.
At present an intestate's property passes differently in Virginia depending upon whether it is personalty or realty. Real
property descends through the fourth step in the following
course:
First. To his children and their descendants.
Second. If there be no child, nor the descendants of any
child, then to his or her father or mother, or the survivor.
Third. If there be neither father nor mother, then to his
or her brothers and sisters, and their descendants.
Fourth. If there be none such, then7 the whole shall go
to the surviving consort of the intestate.
Personal property is distributed in the same fashion with
8
two major exceptions:
(1) Infants.-The personal estate of an infant shall be
distributed as if he were an adult.9
EVa. Code §2537 (1887).
*Va. Code §5273 (1919).
'Va. Code §64-1 (1950).
8 Va. Code §64-11 (1950).
* Va. Code §64-9 (1950): "Descents from infants in certain cases.-If an infant die with.
out issue, having title to real estate derived by gift, devise, or descent from one of
his parents, the whole of it shall descend and pass to his kindred on the side of the
parent from whom it was so derived, if any such kindred be living at the death of
the infant. If there be none such, then it shall descend and pass to his kindred on
the side of the other parent."

(2) Married persons.-If the intestate was married, the
surviving husband or wife shall be entitled to one-third of the
surplus (after payment of funeral expenses, costs of administration, etc.), if the intestate left surviving children or their
descendants (a) of the marriage which was dissolved by the
death of the intestate, (b) of a former marriage, (c) by
legal adoption, or (d) though such children were illegitimate, if the intestate was a wife; but if no such children or
their descendants survive, the surviving husband or wife
shall be entitled to the whole of such surplus.
Perhaps the reason the surviving spouse seems to fare so much
better under the statute of distribution than that of descent is that
the surviving spouse is entitled to dower or curtesy and had been
so entitled even under the common law. The first statutes gave
the widow dower in only one-third of the real estate of the
decedent regardless of whether issue survived or whether the
decedent died testate or intestate. In 1924 an act was passed
giving the widow dqwer in one-third of the realty free from the
rights of creditors, and if the decedent dies intestate and without issue, the widow also has dower in the excess two-thirds
subject to the rights of creditors. 10 In 1922 a provision was enacted giving the widower the same curtesy rights as the dower
rights of a widow.1
Aside from the obvious reasons of dower and curtesy another reason for the difference in transmission of the two types of
property may be found in the early history of this country. The
first settlers had very little personal property; to them land was,
for all intents and purposes, the sole measure of wealth. The
old concepts of land as power and land as wealth lingered on.
There was something magic and something unique about real
property. It had not then become the everyday unit of commerce that it is today, and the early lawmakers, imbued with
English tradition, felt that a definitive difference should be
made between realty and personalty.
Returning to the obvious reasons for the difference, it was
felt that dower and curtesy were adequate interests in realty for
the surviving spouses and there was no need for giving a definite
20 Va.

Acts 1924, p. 460.
11 Va. Acts 1922, p. 861 (wording clarified by Va. Acts 1924, p. 508).

statutory share in fee to the surviving consort. Perhaps a life
estate in all or a portion of the land of the decedent was sufficient
during an age when it was the custom for land to remain in the
same family for generations, when very little land was transferred by sale but most passed by gift, will or descent, and when
one holding a life interest had, for all practical purposes, the
same benefits as one holding the fee. Dower or curtesy did
not act as a very serious restraint on the free alienation of land
because few ever thought of selling part of the family estate.
However, with the passage of time a new economy has developed
in Virginia, as in the nation. No longer is land such a prominent
measure of wealth. The family estate tradition has been pushed
into the background by the new avidity for subdivision. At the
present time land is just another basic commodity of commerce
and as such should receive no different treatment under the law
of intestate succession than personalty.
As so much of the wealth of a modem decedent is likely to
be in the form of bonds and shares of stock, dower and curtesy
estates are not deemed to make adequate provisions and have
been abolished under the Model Probate Code as drafted by the
Real Property Division of the American Bar Association. This
theory is supported by the fact that twenty-three states12 have
either abolished dower and curtesy or else had never enacted
such provisions or adopted the common law. At least seven other
states1 3 have retained dower but it is subject to being barred by
the widow's election to take her statutory share. The majority of
the states that have no dower or curtesy estates also make no
distinction between the distribution of personalty and descent
of realty. Because they do tend to clog land titles and make
alienation more difficult, Virginia should abolish dower and
curtesy. The purpose of these estates Would be more successfully met by providing a definite interest in fee for the surviving
consort.

California, Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine,
Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota,
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming.
's Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, and South
Carolina.
12 Arizona,

In all except thirteen states 14 the surviving spouse is given a
share of the intestates property, real or personal, that has
priority over all other classes of beneficiaries. In five15 of these
thirteen states the surviving spouse takes in the second step, yielding only to issue of the intestate. The statutes providing these
paramount interests for surviving spouses fall roughly into three
categories. One such category is evidenced by the statutes of
New York, Connecticut, and Massachusetts.' 6 The share of
personalty and realty given the surviving spouse of an intestate
under New York law is as follows:
1. If children and/or their representatives survive-onethird.
2. If no child or descendant but a parent or parents survive
-$5,000 and one-half the residue.
3. If no descendant or parent but a brother, sister, nephew,
or niece survives-$10,000 and one-half the residue.
sister, nephew, or
4. If no descendant, parent, brother,
17
niece survives the whole estate.
The law of Massachusetts follows the same general theory but is
even more simplified in that if the decedent leaves issue, the
surviving spouse takes one-third of the property, but if he or
she leaves no issue but kindred of any degree surviving, the survivipg spouse takes $10,000 and one-half the remaining personal
and real property; if no issue or kindred survive, the surviving
spouse takes all.18 Connecticut provides a slight variation by
giving the surviving spouse the usual one-third where children
survive, and if no children survive, the consort takes all of the
estate of the decedent absolutely to the extent of $5,000 and
one-half absolutely of the remainder, and when no child and
no parent survive the decedent, the spouse takes the whole
estate. 19 The least desirable of these three statutes is that of
Massachusetts, if one is to assume that the average individual
would not wish next of kin who are more remote than brothers
and sisters or the issue of such deceased brothers and sisters to
benefit from the estate at the expense of the surviving spouse.
1, Alabama. Delaware, Kentucky Louisiana, New Jersey, North Carolina. Oregon, Rhode
Island, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, West Viinia, and Wisconsin.
Texas and Wisconsin.
i New Jersey, Oregon, Rhode Island.,
19 Also, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, North Dakota, Pennsylvania. ttah, and Wyoming.
I'N.Y. Decedent Estate Law §83 (1950).
Is Ann. Laws of Mass. Ch. 190 (Supp. 1953).
l Conn.Gen.Stats. §7309 (1949).

Another type of provision for the surviving spouse is exemplified by the Indiana Probate Code.2 0 In Indiana the share
of the surviving spouse of an intestate is as folows:
1. One-third of the net estate if the decedent is survived
by two or more children, by one or more children and
the issue of one or more deceased children, or by the
issue of two or more deceased children; or
2. One-half of the net estate if the'decedent is survived by
one child or issue of one deceased child; or
3. Three-fourths of the net estate if the decedent is
survived by one or both parents and no surviving issue;
or
4. All the net estate if the
decedent is survived by no
21
descendants or parents.
The third category of shares for surviving spouses can be
illustrated by the laws of Florida, Georgia, and Mississippi, which
provide that the surviving spouse shall take in class one with a
child and the same amount as a child. This provision is modified
by the Georgia statute which places a one-fifth minimum on
the share to be given the wife.22 Thus, if a man died intestate
leaving five children and a wife, the wife would get one-fifth of
the estate and each child would get one-fifth of the remaining
four-fifths or sixteen per cent of the total estate. Apart from the
thirteen states first mentioned that do not give the surviving
spouse a definite statutory share superior to other beneficiaries,
all of the other states either fall squarely within one of the
above categories or else have some combination of parts of them.
The Georgia-type statute is definitely in the minority, for
although most states seem to feel that the parents, brothers,
sisters, nieces, and nephews of an intestate should not take to the
exclusion of the surviving spouse, neither do they feel that the
surviving spose should take to the total exclusion of such kindred,
especially not to the exclusion of the parents when no descendants survive. The Indiana and Connecticut statutes are both
concerned, when there are no descendants but a parent and a
0 Other states having the same general scheme are California, Idaho. Illinois, Michigan,
Nebras,
M
Nevada, Ohio Oklahoma, and South Carolina.
s2Burns Anno. d. Stats. eec. 6:201 (1953). The life estate provision in the ragraph
which follows the quoted part detracts from the merit of this statute and hence is
not considered here.
22 Code of Ga. Ann. 1113.903 (1933).

spouse surviving, that the parent(s) share in the estate with the
spouse. However, this concern does not extend to other kindred
where there are also no parents. The Indiana statute more ably
and simply accomplishes its purposes because the share given the
parents is not contingent upon the size of the estate being beyond
a given value. There appears to be no logical reason why a
parent should have an interest in an estate in one case while in
another case involving the exact same family structure the parent
should have no interest simply because the estate is smaller.
Unlike Indiana and Connecticut some states have a broader
concept of the kindred who share with the surviving spouse and
include brothers and sisters and their descendants. This extension of concern is manifest in the act of North Dakota which
provides that if there are no children or parents, but a brother,
sister, niece, or nephew surviving, the spouse is given $25,000 and
one-half the remainder of the estate and the residue after such
share is given to such surviving brothers, sisters, and their
24
descendants per stirpes.2 3 Other states, such as Pennsylvania,
go further still and when no children or descendants but blood
kin of any degree survive, such blood kin take the residue of the
estate after the surviving spouses share of $10,000 and one-half
the remainder. The provisions of these states, such as Pennsylvania and North Dakota, are based upon a modification of the
"blood kin" theory upon which the present Virginia statute of
descent is based.
According to an early Virginia case 25 the statute of descent
was "founded on the affections of the heart, and follows the current in its natural flow, preferring as heirs the classes nearest in
blood." The 1954 amendment to Virginia Code Section 63-35826
seems to modify the very theory upon which the statute of descent is founded. Apart from the dubious argument of "blood
kin" there is no logical reason why an intestates brother, sister,
nephew, or niece should take any part of his estate in preference
to his surviving spouse. However, since in Virginia a child is,
certain circumstances being present, under a duty to care for
:-N.D. Rev. Code §56-0104 (1943).
, Purdon's Pa. Stat. Ann. §20-1.2 (1950).
25Davis v. Rowe, 6 Rand. 355 (Va. 1828).
2sAn adopted child inherits only from and through his adopted parents and not his natural
parents.

his parents,27 it appears only just that where no descendants
survive, the parents of a decedent should share in the estate to
some extent with the surviving spouse. Following this reasoning,
and because of the arbitrariness of statutes allowing the surviving spouse a given sum and a fraction of the remainder, if the
General Assembly should decide to draft a new statute of descent
and distribution, the portion of the Indiana law referred to above
would serve as an excellent guide.
A proposal has been made by the Joint Committee on Legislation and Law Reform of the Virginia State Bar and the Virginia
State Bar Association to improve the condition of the surviving
consort by adopting House Bill No. 298, amending Virginia Code
Section 64-1. The only effect of the Bill would be to prefer the
wife or husband over parents, if they survive, and over brothers
and sisters, and their descendants; that is, the surviving spouse
would be moved up to step two in the course of descents. If
this amendment is adopted by the General Assembly there will
still be approximately thirty-five states that give the surviving
consort a better position in connection with the descent of real
property than does Virginia. That the Committee recognizes the
obvious weakness of this proposal is manifest in the following
two statements quoted from the report of the Committee:
*.. it is thought that no injustice to parents or brothers and

sisters could possibly result in a case where the wife takes,
since if the decedent has any definite ideas with reference
to providing for brothers and sisters and/or surviving parents, under the present day state of society, he will in niie
cases out of ten, do so by will rather than by reliance upon
the statute.
...

And there is, of course, always the right of the decedent

to make
provisions for his widow, if there are children, by
28
will.

In its attempt to support a statute, the sole purpose of which is to
determine the descent of the property of a decedent who did not
leave a will, it would appear that the Committee is relying too
heavily upon the decedents right to make a will.
21 Va. Code §20-88 (1950).
'. Report of the Committee on Legislation and Law Reform, 3 Va. Bar News 6 (1955).

The Committee specifically states that they see no necessity
for making any change in either the dower or curtesy statutes.
It is gratifying to see the desire of this group to improve the
status of the surviving spouse, but it is disheartening to note
the ease with which they dismiss the possibility of changing the
dower and curtesy statutes. The first requirement of any code
of law dealing with intestate succession is that it should be as
clear and as easy to administer as possible. The Virginia statute is
clear but it will never be easy to administer until the estates of
dower and curtesy are abolished. The inconvenience of administration that results from the conferment of life interests is
unreasonable. In addition to obstructing land titles and making
alienation more difficult, these estates frequently form the basis
for family dissension.
With the abolition of dower and curtesy a statutory share
for the surviving spouse is imperative. Another requirement of
an intestate succession law is that it reflect as nearly as possible
the intention of the ordinary layman. The Virginia statute of
descent is a trap for the unwary. The average man often believes that when he dies his wife will inherit all his property,
or at least one-third of it; if he has heard of dower, he generally
construes it to be a fee interest. The wife shares this belief and
when the husband dies she sometimes sells the property which
she believes belongs to her but which actually may belong to some
grandnephew. Misconceptions such as these are a real source of
disturbance and of entanglement in the law of real property and
can only be avoided by changing the statute to correspond to
the wishes and belief of the common man. In keeping with these
changes, and as there is no longer any foundation for it, the
distinction between the descent of realty and the distribution of
personalty should be set aside.
Change simply for the sake of change should be avoided, and
especially in this field should be made only after careful consideration of our system of law as a whole. However, it would seem
when statutes are capable of so many inequities and result in a
burden on an otherwise smoothly functioning law of property
that the matter should be studied thoroughly and a law drafted
more in keeping with modem legislation and the current structure of society.
Nancy Coleman Messick

